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Chapter 2
The Ten Countries and
Their Payments Regimes
The economic characteristics of the ten countries covered in the NBER project
are described in this chapter. There are two broad bases upon which the rele-
vant features of these countries', economies will be examined: their growth and
structure, and their experience with trade and payments regimes. This ex-
amination should provide some background for the more detailed discussions
of later chapters and also give an indication of the degree to which the coun-
tries can be regarded as representative of other developing countries.
In the first section the size, income level, sectoral composition of output,
and other pertinent characteristics of growth and structure of the project coun-
tries are considered. The next section outlines hypotheses about the historical
sequence of the phases of exchange control regimes. These phases were for-
malLy developed in the analytical framework stage of the project, and they
have been used as reference points throughout the project. The phases provide
a convenient framework for tracing experience with trade and payments
regimes in the ten countries, and that is done in the third section of this
chapter.
I. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROJECT COUNTRIES
The ten countries for which detailed studies were completed were Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Egypt, Ghana, India, Israel, South Korea, the Philippines, and
Turkey. Each has had balance-of-payments difficulties at various times and
has employed more than one type of trade and payments regime to grapple
with its problems.
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Although the characteristic common to all the countries is the fact that
trade and payments regimes have been central concerns of policy, there is a
great deal of diversity among them with regard to other characteristics. They
are representative of various geographic regions and include three Latin
American, three Middle Eastern, one African, and three Asian countries. They
also differ considerably in size, income level, and growth experience.
Size, Income, and Growth Rates
Table 2-1 contains estimates of some key variables. The first three columns
give estimates of population and of gross and per capita domestic product in
1970 for each of the ten countries. Estimates in terms of local currency have
been translated into 1970 U.S. dollars to make them comparable across coun-
tries.' As can be seen, the ten countries vary widely in size—Chile, Ghana, and
Israel have small populations; India and Brazil are large; and the remaining
five, with populations between 20 and 40 million, are of medium size. The
countries covered by the project are a group with larger populations than
would be found in a representative sample of developing countries.
While comparisons of output levels valued in a single currency are subject
to wide margins of error, the dollar value of real GDP—column 2 of Table
2-1—gives a rough idea of the size of internal markets. India and Brazil are
large in both respects, although the disparity in GDP between the two is much
smaller than the proportionate differences in population. However, distinc-
tions based on population between the "small" and "medium" countries blur
when real GDPs are compared. Israel's high per capita income offsets her
small population, so that her real output appears to have been more than four-
fifths that of Chile in 1970, despite a population less than one-third as large.
Ghana's internal market appears to be distinctly smaller than that of the other
countries included in the project, while domestic markets in Turkey and the
Philippines are probably significantly larger than those in the remaining coun-
tries.
The third column of Table 2-1 gives levels of per capita product for 1970,
or the year closest to it for which data are available. India's per capita income
is extremely low—less than half that of the next poorest country as judged by
the official conversions. Israel's per capita income was far and away the
highest of the group. By the mid-l960s, in fact, Israel had emerged from the
developing country stage. But Israel could not have been considered a
developed country in the early 1950s, and was included in the project because
of her experience with trade and payments regimes during the course of her
rapid growth.2
The last four columns of Table 2-1 give estimated annual average growth
rates of real GDP for the four five-year intervals from 1950 to 1970. Rates of
e NBER project
which the rele-
heir growth and
gimes. This ex-
iled discussions
vhich the coun-
untries.
ition of output,
ie project coun-
ut the historical
hases were for-
oject, and they
phases provide
and payments
section of this
OUNTRIES
e Brazil, Chile,
hilippines, and
ious times and
ime to grapple
14 PAYMENT REGIMES
Table 2-1. Population, Gross Domestic Product, and Per Capita Product, 1970
and Real Growth Rates, 1950.1970, Ten Countries
Gross
Domestic
Product Per Capita Av erage Annual Growth Rate
Country
Population
(millions
of persons)
(millions
of 1970
U.S. dollars)
GDP
(1970 U.S.
dollars)
of Real GDP
(percent per annum)
1950-55 1955-60 1960.65 1965.70
Brazil 95 34,511 362 6.8 6.9 4.5 7.5
Chile 10 6,657 681 2.9 4.9 3.5
Colombia 21 8,648 409 4.6 4.7 5.7
Egypt 33 6,831 210 5.8 4.5
Ghana 9 2,518 279 na. 6.2 3.2 2.3
India 537 53,504 84 3.7 4.0 2.6 4.6
Israel 3 5,343 1,836 15.3 10.5 10.7 7.2
South Korea 32 8,141 256 5•5a 3.8 6.3 11.1
Philippines 37 13,903 361 8.1 5.0 5.6 6.0
Turkey 35 12,799 363 6.6 5.2 4.4 7.0
na. = not available.
Sources: Population—International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, midyear
estimates, 1970; 1970 GDP and per capita income data—United Nations, Yearbook of National
Accounts Statistics 1971. Ghanaian figures are for 1969. Indian data are from Central
Statistical Office, National Accounts Statistics 1960-61 — 19 72-73 (New Delhi, 1975); growth
rate data are simple averages of annual rates and are taken from the country studies, with the
following exceptions and qualifications: Chilean and Colombian growth rates are from
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics; Egyptian growth rates were provided by Bent
Hansen; Indian data are from National Accounts Statistics 1960-61 — 19 72-73; South Korean
growth rates are for gross national product and are from Frank, Kim, and Westphal, Table 2-4.
allere the rate for 1950-1955 is the average for 1954 and 1955 only.
growth have varied enormously. Ghana, Chile, and India experienced so little
growth that per capita incomes rose hardly at all, while Israel experienced
rapid growth throughout. Other countries underwent marked changes in
growth performance during this period. South Korea's growth rate averaged
less than 5 percent for the 1950s, but then accelerated markedly during the
1960s, reaching 11.1 percent for the second half of the decade. Brazil's
generally rapid growth decelerated abruptly in the early and middle 1960s, but
rose to an even higher rate late in the decade. Colombia, the Philippines, and
Turkey all had relatively satisfactory growth rates, with slower growth in the
late 1950s and some acceleration in the rate in the last half of the 1960s.
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Table 2-2 gives the percentage distribution of GDP among different
economic sectors in 1960 and 1970 for each of the ten countries. Current-price
GDP figures were used in order to reflect the relative importance of the
various sectors in domestic economic activity.3 India and Ghana have the
highest share of income originating in agriculture; Brazil, Chile, Israel, and
South Korea have the proportionately largest manufacturing sectors. In ab-
solute terms, India's manufacturing sector is probably second only to Brazil's
among the ten countries covered in this project, as well as among developing
countries in general.
The "Other Industry" sector includes mining as well as electricity, gas,
and water. The large size of that sector in Chile reflects the importance of her
mineral sector. Although other countries—notably the Philippines and
Turkey—have sizable mineral exports, they are not anywhere near as impor-
tant in terms of domestic economic activity as is the Chilean mining sector.
As the data in Table 2-2 show, the relative importance of agriculture
declined in every country included in the project except the Philippines, where
expansion of agricultural output for export and relative price changes led to
the opposite trend. The most remarkable shift among sectors between 1960
and 1970 occurred in South Korea, where manufacturing value added rose
from 14 to 21 percent of GDP, and agricultural value added fell from 37 to 28
percent of GDP.
GDP BY EXPENDITURE CATEGORY
Table 2-3 provides estimates of the percentage distribution of GDP by ex-
penditure category. Although there have been year-to-year fluctuations in the
pattern, the 1960 and 1970 data are fairly representative of the levels for sur-
rounding years, and changes between those years reflect some of the trends
that took place over the decade.
The ratio of private consumption to GDP fell over the decade in all coun-
tries except Brazil. The sharpest declines were in South Korea, Israel, and the
Philippines. In contrast, public consumption rose as a fraction of GDP in all
countries except Brazil, South Korea, and Turkey. Total consumption
behavior varied from country to country, resulting in diverse trends in capital
formation. There was a sharp rise in gross domestic capital formation (GDCF)
in South Korea, from 11 tO 26 percent of GDP, and a pronounced increase in
the Philippines—from 11 to 19 percent. Increased public consumption more
than offset the decreasing share of private consumption in Egypt, Ghana, and
Israel, so that GDCF as a percent of GDP fell in those countries.
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The final two columns of Table 2-3 give exports and imports as a percent
of GDP. The difference between the two reflects the trade balance, not the en-
tire current account, although the magnitudes are, in general, indicative of the
importance of capital flows. Three countries had capital inflows in excess of 2
to 3 percent of GDP in 1960 and 196W70: Egypt, Israel, and South Korea.
• This reflects relatively sustained phenomena in these countries; donations have
been important for Israel, official lending has been a major factor in Egypt,
and official aid in the 1950s and private capital inflows in the 1960s were im-
portant for South Korea. Other countries also generally experienced net in-
flows, but they were of smaller proportions and importance than for the three
mentioned above.
It is evident that the countries covered in the project vary considerably in
the relative importance of exports and of the foreign trade sector in output and
expenditures. Israel's exports have grown more rapidly than GDP, with their
share of output rising from 17 to 28 percent. Ghana started with a very high
Table 2-3. Distribution of GDP by Expenditure Categories, Ten Countries,
1960 and 1970 (percent of GDP)
V
0
a
C
a
a C
2
a 'a .9
- C, 'a
'a
.2
—
C) a
0
2
a
0
0
C
a
— a
C)
CC
a
a
CC
a
CC
.0
a
CC
a
C) CC
C-
.0
0
'a
CC
0
a CC
C-
C) C) C-
.
.Consumption Gross DomesticCapital
Increase
in
Country Year Private Public Formation Stocks Exports Imports
Brazil 1960
1969
70
72
13
12 ••
17
16
1
0
6
8
—7
—8
Chile 1960
1970
75
70
11
14
15
15
2
1
14
16
—17
—16
Colombia 1960
1970
73
72
6
8
18
20
2
2
16
14
—16
—16
Egypt 1960
1969
68
65
18
24
15
12
0
2
19
14
—21
—18
Ghana 1960
1970
73
69
10
18
20
11
2
1
26
19
—31
—18
India 1960
1969
79
75
7
9
13
15
3
1
5
4
—8
—5
Israel 1960
1970
70
62
19
36
25
24
2
1
17
28
—33
—52
South Korea 1960
1970
85
. 73
15
11
11
26
0
2
3
15
—13
—25
Philippines 1960
1970
78
71
8
9
11
19
2
2
12
20
—11
—20
Turkey 1960
1970
74
71
13
12
15
19
3
3
4
6
—6
•9
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of National Account Statistics, 1971, vol. III.
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Table 2-4. Apercent of exports—in excess of one-fourth of GDP—but that share declined, Composition
reaching 19 percent in 1970. The Philippines and South Korea experienced a
remarkable increase in the importance of exports during the 1960s. In the
Philippines, exports rose from 12 to 20 percent of GDP, reflecting both
volume increases and large price gains for Philippine products. South Korea's
performance was even more notable: her exports from 3 percent of GDP
in 1960 to 15 percent in 1970. Brazil, India, and Turkey had relatively low and Country
stable shares of exports in GDP over the period, and Chile and Colombia also
had stable, but higher, export flows of between 14 and 16 percent in 1960 and Brazil
1970. chiLe
Colombiab
Egyptc
GROWTH AND COMPOSITION OF ExpoRTs
Ghana
Table 2-4 details some further aspects of ten countries' export struc- Indiad
tures.The first two columns give the average annual rates of growth of the lsraele
dollar value of exports for the two decades of the fifties and the sixties. Ex- South Korea
ports from Israel and South Korea (in the 1960s) increased phenomenally; in Phiiippinest
their cases, dollar values provide a fairly accurate indication of volume trends Turkey
because export prices changed very little. Brazil's negative average growth rate
Sources: Internati
in export earnings in the 1950s reflects both declining export volumes and ex-
aManufactured exiport price changes, and her export growth rate accelerated rapidly in the late 1969.
1960s. The high rate of growth of export earnings in Chile in the 1960s was bFor Colombia
primarily due to an increase in copper prices. Exports from Egypt and India Manufactured exp
grew only slowly throughout this period; price changes were of some impor- cEgyptian data are
tance in the 1950s and volumes did not increase significantly. Turkey's low dlndjan data in th
growth rate in exports during the 1950s was exclusively a volume phenomenon, the year 1970/7 1.
but Columbia's resulted from export price changes. The Philippine export elsrael's largest ex
growth rate was primarily the result of an unusually set of price less importance in
"percent matrends for her exports, although volume also grew during each decade. the largest ten corn
Ghana's export earning actually declined during the 1960s despite an increase
of more than 50 percent in the price of her principal export, cocoa.
The fourtiThe third to fifth columns of Table 2-4 indicate the concentration and
commodity composition of exports. The third column gives the percent of ex- from the three
port earnings in 1970 that derived from each country's largest single export the additional
commodity. For all countries other than Israel and South Korea, the largest heavily depend
single exports are primary commodities—for Chile, it is copper; for the Philip- are cotton-rela
pines, wood; for the others, agricultural commodities. South Korea exports with heavy reF
more textile products than any other good, and Israel's largest single export in coffee export
dollar value is diamonds. Israel's export structure is far less concentrated than reduced consi
these data would suggest, however, because the diamonds are first imported in and Turkey, e:
rough form, then cut in Israel and re-exported; net exports would include only equal importa
the value added through processing of the diamonds. and for the Ph
L
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Table Average Annual Rate of Export Growth, by Decades, 1950-1970, and
Composition of Exports, 1970, Ten Countries
Country
Average Annual Rate
of Growth of Exports
(dollar value)
Composition of Exports, 1970
(percent of total dollar value)
Three
Largest Largest Manufactured
Export Exports Exports1950-60 1960-70
Brazil —.5 8.0 34.2 47.5 11.2
Chilea 5.7 9.8 75.8 84.3 10.5
Colombiab
EgyptC
Ghana
1.6 4.6
1.0 3.1
44 —3.0
60.8 65.4 10.6
44.8 80.8 38.8
68.0 80.2 7.4
Indiad 1.5 4.2 12.4 27.0 14.7
Israele 20.0 13.6 31.7 56.7 76.9
South Korea 1.7 41.7 21.3 40.5 83.6
5.4 6.6 23.5 61.4 17.3
Turkey 2.5 5.8 25.6 55.4 14.3
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, and country studies.
aManufactured exports for Chile are for 1965, and the shares of largest and three Largest are for
1969.
bFor Colombia there are only two major exports; all others are treated as "minor."
Manufactured export percentage was taken from Di'az-Alejandro, Table 11-3.
CEgyptian data are for 1968.
dlndian data in the first three columns are from Bhagwati and Srinivasan, Table 9-1, and are for
the year 1970/71.
elsrael's largest export is diamonds, which are imported, cut, and re-exported; they are of much
less importance in terms of value added.
"percent manufactured" figure for the Philippines is "minor exports" and includes all but
the largest ten commodity exports given in Baldwin, Table 1-3.
The fourth column of the table gives the percent of export value derived
from the three largest exports in 1970. In most cases the relative importance of
the additional commodities is not great. Chile, Colombia, and Ghana are all
heavily dependent on a single primary export. All of Egypt's principal exports
are cotton-related, and Egypt should therefore be regarded as a fourth country
with heavy reliance on a single commodity. Brazil was greatly dependent on
coffee export earnings during the l950s, but the growth of other exports has
reduced considerably the share of coffee in total exports. In the Philippines
and Turkey, exports are less concentrated in that several are of approximately
equal importance: for Turkey, tobacco and cotton are equally predominant,
and for the Philippines, wood and coconut products are of approximately the
20 PAYMENT REGIMES.
same importance, with sugar and copper not very far behind. India, Israel, Korea probabl3
and South Korea also have relatively diverse export structures. policies of
The final column in Table 2-4 gives the percentage of export earnings to a lesser de
originating in manufactured products. By 1970 Israeli and South Korean ex- gr
ports were predominantly manufactured products, and Egypt exported cotton Rates of I fi
textiles. In all other countries manufactured exports were a relatively small " at
fraction of total exports. Although the n
on the role of
Growth Strategies changes—are
regime. Table 2
These data provide only a few indicators of the characteristics and growth of ten countries. S
each of the countries. They do not yield any insights into the policies and con- Table 2-5 ohs
ditions that generated the economic performance of the individual countries, decade.5 The
Insofar as trade and payments policies and their interaction with growth are 1960-1970, for
central themes in this volume, a short characterization of the basic outlines of nually in the fir
growth policy in each of the ten countries will provide useful background.4 1960s.
In all ten countries the stated objectives of the government included a Despite y
great deal of emphasis on economic growth. For Israel and Egypt, defense reasonably acci
considerations were accorded greater priority, and the governments of both considerable di
Egypt and India seem to have attached somewhat greater importance to had relatively li
equalizing income distribution than did the others; however, these countries sharply. Brazil,
adhered to the growth objective as well. In every case rapid growth was a lion well above
stated objective of policy. In most countries development plans were drawn
up, and national debates about growth strategies centered around these plans.
In virtually all of the countries, rapid growth was equated with in- Table 2-5. B
dustrialization. Emphasis was usually placed on encouraging those industries
that could produce goods currently being imported. In many cases in- —
dustrialization strategies shifted over time. At one extreme, India and Turkey, Country 19
throughout the period covered by the country studies, consistently chose an
import-substitution strategy to foster industrial development. While balance- Brazil
of-payments considerations often led to import restrictions even more severe Chile
than would have been employed to achieve industrialization, there can be little Colombia 3
doubt that import substitution would have predominated in any event. Chile, Egypt 8
Ghana, and the Philippines heavily protected import-substitution activities, Ghana 6
although probably to a smaller extent than India and Turkey. Egypt also seems India 8
to have had a consistent, but milder, bias toward import substitution. Israel 2
No country covered in the project relied on an export-promotion strategy South Korea
throughout. However, in Brazil after 1968, in South Korea after about 1961, Philippines 7
and in Israel after 1962, an earlier strategy of import substitution was replaced Turkey 3
by a shift toward export promotion. To a lesser extent Colombia also shifted Source: Internatia
away from import substitution after 1967 and began to encourage the growth aFor Ghana and I
of nontraditional exports. The export-promotion policies of Brazil and South does not cover bat
bprjces are annual
L
India, Israel,
earnings
Ith Korean cx-
tported cotton
elatively small
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Korea probably represent the opposite extreme from the import-substitution
policies of India and Turkey. Israel and Colombia were biased toward exports
to a lesser degree.
Rates of Inflation
Although the nature of the exchange control regime has a significant influence
on the role of the exchange rate, monetary factors—especially price level
changes—are of great importance under any type of trade and payments
regime. Table 2-5 provides basic data on the behavior of the price level for the
ten countries. Some of the ten-year averages shown in the last two columns of
Table 2-5 obscure wide fluctuations in the rate of inflation within each
decade.5 The average annual Brazilian inflation rate of 39 percent for
1960-1970, for example, is the result of inflation in excess of 50 percent an-
nually in the first half of the decade, and rates of around 20 percent in the late
1960s.
Despite year-to-year fluctuations, the data in Table 2-5 provide a
reasonably accurate reflection of the experience of the ten countries. There is
considerable diversity among them. Egypt, India, and the Philippines have
had relatively low rates of inflation, but each has had periods when prices rose
sharply. Brazil, Chile, and South Korea have experienced annual rates of infla-
tion well above 10 percent throughout the 1950 to 1970 period, although South
Table 2-5. Behavior of Wholesale Prices, Ten Countries, 1950-1970
Country
Wh olesale Frice Index (1963 = 100)a
Average Annual
Percentage Increaseb
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1950-1960 1960-1970
Brazil 4 10 27 289 739 21 39
Chile 3 15 60 187 666 35 27
Colombia 33 40 72 127 195 8 10
Egypt 82 84 100 112 133 2 3
Ghana 66 76 82 141 167 2 7
India 82 69 93 119 166 1 6
Israel 26 66 80 113 138 10 6
South Korea 1 41 67 148 216 45 12
Philippines 75 70 83 107 145 1 6
Turkey 34 44 88 109 145 10 5
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Line 63.
aFor Ghana and Israel, indexes are the consumer price index, since the wholesale price index
does not cover both decades.
bPiices are annual averages of monthly observations.
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Korea's inflation rate fell in the late 1960s. Colombia, Israel, and Turkey have Import repleni
had a moderate degree of inflation; Israel and Turkey were able to reduce their Rebates on imrate of inflation in the 1960s from what it had been in the 1950s. India, the
Philippines, and Ghana appear to have had relatively little inflation in the Rights granted
1950s, but experienced more in the 1960s. All of the project countries had ac- Special regime
celerating rates of inflation in the early 1970s.
Multiple exchaFor all of the project countries except Egypt, inflation during the 1960s
was sufficiently in excess of the rate among the developed countries so speci import
that—on that score alone—balance-of-payments difficulties would probably Subsidies for c
have been encountered had exchange rates not been altered.6 This Low-interest ic
phenomenon is of great importance in understanding the outcomes of
endeavors to alter the nature of the trade and payments, regime. Since most of
titative levels, 1
II. DELINEATION OF THE PHASES are identical ir
Even thou
In principle there is no limit to the variety of alternate trade and payments herently differ
regimes that might be adopted to balance foreign exchange expenditures and the individual
receipts. Regimes that do not systematically employ quantitative restrictions gregation is ne
may use some combination of tariffs and taxes on current account transactions developed for
and even occasional quantitative restrictions; capital account transactions are regimes were d
almost always subject to some general limitations, authors could
For exchange control regimes, the situation is even more complex. Even a of regime'toa
physically constant import quota implies changes over time in the implicit or The basic
explicit value of import licenses accruing tolicense recipients. It would be a tent to which a
rare occurrence indeed for an exchange control authority to alter physical as a means of r
allocations so that the restrictionist content and structure of the regime re- above, some w
mained unaltered, even if that were the desired goal. But much more than that were price intei
is involved. A great variety of instruments may be employed in administering low-interest
QR regimes, including: the relative imi
detail below, g
Guarantee deposits, varying in amount for different categories of import exclusive use o
licenses.7 Phase II is a s
are also emplo:
Tariffs and surcharges. places relativel
Licenses for different categories of imports allocated by different criteria and a period of tra
procedures. of pricing inte
Prohibited lists, free lists, and special exemptions. It should
the
Regulation and licensing of exports. framework tha
Various incentives, sometimes project-specific, to encourage private capital in- the exchange
flows, policy, to reguJ
Restrictions on the repatriation of profits and dividends of foreign-owned or external dis
firms. board
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d Turkey have Import replenishment schemes applying to some exports.
to reduce their Rebates on import duties for exports.
50s. India, the
riflation in the Rights granted to exporters to resell part of their foreign exchange earnings.
untries had ac- Special regimes for government enterprises.
Multiple exchange rates, including special tourist rates, export subsidies, and
iring the 1960s special import categories subject to exchange auction.
I countries SO
rould probably Subsidies for capital goods imports.
altered.6 This Low-interest loans for certain classes of transactions.
outcomes of
Since most of these instruments can be employed at many different quan-
titative levels, the variation in exchange control regimes is infinite, and no two
are identical in form or substance.
Even though each regime has its own unique features, treating each as in-
and payments herently different from every other would defeat analysis of the results from
penditures and the individual country studies; some unifying form of classification or ag-
lye restrictions gregation is necessary. Such a scheme was set out in the analytical framework
nt transactions developed for this project. Five different phases of trade and payments
ransactions are regimes were distinguished; this distinction provided a basis on which country
authors could conveniently characterize regimes and trace shifts from one type
Even a of regime to another.
the implicit or The basic principle of classification underlying the five phases is the ex-
It would be a tent to which a Country relies on quantitative—as opposed to price—measures
alter physical asa means of regulating its trade and payments.8 Among the instruments listed
the regime re- above, some were quantitative controls, such as import licenses, while others
more than that were price interventions, such as export subsidies, multiple exchange rates, and
administering low-interest loans. Every trade and payments regime combines both types, but
the relative importance attached to each varies. The phases, described in more
detail below, go from heavy reliance on quantitative restrictions (Phase I) to
ries of import exclusive use of price interventions (Phase V). The phases between are hybrids:
Phase II is a system of quantitative restrictions within which price measures
are also employed; a Phase IV system may employ quantitative restrictions but
places relatively greater reliance on pricing instruments; Phase III is defined as
ent criteria and a period of transition from reliance on quantitative restrictions to greater use
of pricing interventions.
It should be noted that no necessary chronological sequence is implied by
the numbering of the phases. Indeed, it was suggested in the analytical
framework that countries are often in Phase V (reliance almost exclusively on
capital in- the exchange rate and other price interventions, including macroeconomic
policy, to regulate the balance of payments) when a crisis arises due to internal
foreign-owned or external disturbances; one possible reaction would be to impose across-the-
board quantitative restrictions on imports (Phase I) in an effort to cope with
I
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the crisis.9 In other cases countries might be in a Phase II regime, devalue their However, two
currencies (Phase III), and then return to a reliance on quantitative restrictions ly unimportan
(Phase I or H, depending on the nature of the regime). workings of th
Obviously when trade and payments regimes are constantly changing in price measures
greater or lesser degree, the delineation of phases has an arbitrary element, as
- trol system. ii
does any aggregation scheme. On the whole, however, the categorization ports and subs
proves useful. Detailed descriptions of the phases are given below; the section foreign exchar
following describes the experience of each country with its trade and payments titative restrict
regime. change rates
goods—there i
Phase I The comp
an undifferent
Phase I is characterized by the imposition or sharp intensification of relatively rather than an
undifferentiated—or across-the-board—controls. It might start from any of creasing prolif
the other phases in response to a potential and unsustainable payments deficit exchange
resulting from intense or sustained domestic inflationary pressure or from a of the regime.
sharp drop in world prices for some major exports, as in the Great Depression planners' and
or in 1952/53. Reasons for instituting controls are of interest in understanding parts, and in
the nature of the regime, but they are not critical to the definition of Phase I. "Priorities" a
Throughout Phase I, controls are generally maintained or intensified. termediate im
They might be maintained simply because of the need to continue offsetting sumer goods.
excess demand for imports at an overvalued exchange rate. Their severity tual users and
might be increased because of any of several interrelated factors: (1) the initial goods, or cons
controls might fail to correct sufficiently the unsustainable payments deficit; dustry; and so
(2) the initial set of controls might result in evasions of the system, thus reduc- With eaci
ing the deficit by an amount less than anticipated; (3) once the new in- regulations su
struments are instituted, policymakers may find them handy for a variety of mounts, both
other purposes as an administratively "easy" device; and (4) policymakers of favoritism.
may perceive their actions to be freed from a balance-of-payments constraint change transac
and adopt policies that in fact require additional restrictiveness to offset fur- other
ther adverse effects on the balance of payments. the
Phase I decisionmaking and policies may perhaps be characterized as regulations. B
"undifferentiated" to a greater extent than in other phases. Quantitative decisions and
restrictions are applied with relatively few rules, and treatment of competing arbitrary beha
claims to import licenses tends to be relatively uniform. Rules for license Since virt
allocation tend to be of an across-the-board nature, such as allocating licenses more aspects
as a specified fraction of the applicant's base-year imports or allotting licenses fragmented an
pro rata with applications. may attempt t
production, w
Phase II same goods to
The vario
Phase II is characterized by continued upon quantitative restrictions in the country
and, indeed, generally increased restrictiveness of the entire control system. ducts, and use
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However, two additional and related aspects of the QR system—both relative-
ly unimportant during Phase I—become significant in Phase II: the detailed
workings of the control system become increasingly complex and specific, and
price measures are adopted to buttress the functioning of the quantitative con-
trol system. The imposition of price measures, such as duties and taxes on im-
ports and subsidies to exports, implies that the de facto, or implicit, price of
foreign exchange is above the parity rate. The primary reliance upon quan-
titative restrictions in Phase II generally indicates that—even with implicit ex-
change rates above the official exchange rate for various categories of
goods—there is excess demand for foreign exchange at those rates."
The complexity of Phase II stems from dissatisfaction with the results of
an undifferentiated system. It generally is the result of many small decisions,
rather than an overall policy design. Thus, one hallmark of Phase II is the in-
creasing proliferation of detailed regulations governing various aspects of the
exchange control regime. Many,factors contribute to the increased complexity
of the regime. The initial, undifferentiated licensing rules are not related to
planners' and policymakers' priorities; plants close because they lack spare
parts, and inadequate supplies of raw materials slow down production.
"Priorities" are therefore established to attempt to maintain flows of in-
termediate imports, capital goods, and occasionally even "essential" con-
sumer goods. Imports are distinguished according to destination, between ac-
tual users and wholesalers; according to type—capital goods, intermediate
goods, or consumer goods; according to the "priority" status of the using in-
dustry; and so on.
With each increase in the number of categories the number of rules and
regulations surrounding the classification of imports into those categories
mounts, both as a matter of policy and to protect bureaucrats from allegations
of favoritism. Simultaneously, controls over exports and other foreign ex-
change transactions are differentiated. At the policy level, cabinet officers and
other high-level decisionmakers feel they are losing control over the results of
the quantitative restriction regime and attempt to regain it by imposing new
regulations. Bureaucrats, meanwhile, must make increasingly fine individual
decisions and adopt additional rules to protect themselves from allegations of
arbitrary behavior.
Since virtually every government ministry becomes involved in one or
more aspects of the decisionmaking process, decisionmaking becomes highly
fragmented and often internally inconsistent. Thus, a ministry of agriculture
may attempt to increase fertilizer or tractor imports to encourage agricultural
production, while a ministry of industries is trying to reduce imports of those
same goods to encourage domestic production.
The various levels at which these conflicts can occur are well documented
in the country studies. Allocation of import licenses among categories, pro-
ducts, and users results in intense competition among conflicting interests at
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all levels: private sector versus public sector, wholesalers versus industrialists, removal of QR
region versus region, and so on. Efforts to decide among conflicting claims finance,
are, of necessity, subject to question, and questions and criticism abound. The can begin with a
more bureaucrats try to protect themselves by adopting additional rules, the replacement of
more the question of which rule applies becomes paramount, and the more rate, with contii
scope there is for internal inconsistency, for administrative discretion, and for of the trade and
favoritism and outright corruption. change rate and
The second characteristic of Phase H is the resort to price measures to Phase III c
supplement the QR regime. This generally occurs with respect to both exports altered structuri
and imports. The continuation or intensification of the "foreign exchange operation, it mi
shortage" inspires measures to increase export earnings. Like the quantitative for several yea
restrictions discussed above, export incentives tend to be adopted in a devaluation-and
piecemeal and fragmented fashion. Rebate schemes, "import replenishment" •within the econ
schemes, special credits for exporters, and a variety of other devices may be in- with Phase Ill e
stituted to offset part or all of the discrimination against exports that is im- at length there.
plicit in an overvalued exchange rate.
Price measures are also adopted to absorb part of the excess demand for
imports. Tariffs may be raised, surcharges added to the cost of importing, and Phase IV
guarantee deposits are generally required on various categories of imports.
These and other measures tend to reduce—at least temporarily—the windfall Phase IV featur
gain, or premium, accruing to the recipients of import licenses. Premium- restrictions in
absorbing charges against imports are changed frequently and, indeed, small response to the
and frequent changes are an integral part of Phase II. For this reason, of export earni
characterizing a Phase II regime at a particular moment in time is extremely creasing at an a
difficult and will fail to capture fully the nature of that regime. price of foreign
devaluation. It
Phase III improved terms
and aid.
As defined here, Phase III usually starts with a formal parity change in ex- When fore
change rates to reflect the de facto price of foreign exchange. This is accom- mand for foreig
panied by removal of some of the detailed regulations and a reduction in the tions or for in
multiplicity of rates found in Phase II. Because of these changes the increase in managing the t
the effective price of foreign exchange is smaller than the increase in the parity licenses are not
rate. It is possible that the removal of export incentives and import surcharges then the restrict
may, in fact, leave the effective exchange rate unaltered, and in many instances ed, either by re:
there may be negligible or even negative devaluation for some categories of net result is mci
goods. foreign
Removal or simplification of the import surcharges and export incentives Phase IV
that were previously in effect results in smaller variance in the implicit effective diminishing. If
exchange rates and in the protection accorded various activities. Greater tightening QRs
uniformity of effective exchange rates and a parity change are integral aspects system. If QR5
of this phase. It may also have other features, including partial or extensive change,'2 the c
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removal of QRs, alteration of tariff schedules, and restructuring of public
finance, monetary management, and external debt. Thus, Phase III episodes
can begin with a wide range of actions. They may involve only adjustments—a
replacement of tariffs, taxes, and subsidies by the altered official exchange
rate, with continued reliance upon QRs—or may involve major restructuring
of the trade and payments regime, with a significant change in the effective ex-
change rate and an alteration in the nature of the QR regime.
Phase HI continues until the intial readjustment of the economy to the
altered structure of incentives is effected. In the case of a simple tidying-up
operation, it may be of very short duration. In other cases Phase Ill may last
for several years if the massive change in relative prices set off by a
devaluation-and-liberalization" package leads to a slow internal readjustment
within the economy. Detailed consideration of the ten countries' experience
with Phase III episodes is the subject of Part II of this volume and is evaluated
at length there.
Phase IV
Phase IV features greater emphasis on price mechanisms than on quantitative
restrictions in managing the balance of payments. It usually follows in
response to the Phase III change in the foreign exchange regime, if the volume
of export earnings (and other current account sales to foreigners) starts in-
creasing at an acceptable rate, or if demand for imports declines at the higher
price of foreign exchange, or if speculation against the currency abates after
devaluation. It can also occur because of favorable exogenous events, such as
improved terms of trade or an increased flow of private foreign investment
and aid.
When foreign exchange availability grows at least as rapidly as the de-
mand for foreign exchange, there is no need for additional quantitative restric-
tions or for increased restrictiveness of existing controls for purposes of
managing the balance of payments. Thus the implicit premiums on import
licenses are not increasing. If foreign exchange receipts grow rapidly enough,
then the restrictionist content of the trade and payments regime can be reduc-
ed, either by removing QRs or by liberalizing import licensing practices. The
net result is increased reliance upon the price mechanism for the allocation of
foreign exchange and a reduced burden for quantitative controls.
Phase IV continues as long as reliance on QRs is unchanged or
diminishing. If a reappearance of payments difficulties should be met by
tightening QRs, the Phase IV regime may be replaced by a Phase I or II
system. If QRs are abandoned as a device for allocating scarce foreign ex-
change,2 the country is said to be in Phase V.
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Phase V
Phase V is a period during which an exchange regime is fully liberalized, in the
sense that there is virtually full convertibility on current account, and quan-
titative restrictions are not employed as a means of regulating the balance of
payments. Thus an economy in Phase V is not an exchange control regime in
the accepted sense of the term, and Phase V represents an alternative to the QR
regimes. For Phase V to continue, the growth of foreign exchange receipts
must approximately equal the growth of demand for foreign exchange. This is
accomplished because the price of foreign exchange is sufficiently high or
because monetary and fiscal policies are employed as the instruments to
achieve payments balance.
III. PHASES IN THE PROJECT COUNTRIES
Phases in Each Country
The characterization of the five phases is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, and
pinpointing the precise date at which a country shifted from one phase to
another is—with the possible exception of the start of Phase Ill—extremely
difficult.'3 Nonetheless, country authors used the phase schematic to classify
country experiences, and that classification provides a means of briefly review-
ing the experience of each country and of comparing it with others. The reader
may find references to Figure 2-1 helpful in following the discussion.
Brazil's relatively liberal payments regime of the immediate postwar years
was short-lived. Internal inflation at a fixed nominal exchange rate resulted in
unsustainable payments deficits once the reserves built up during World War
II had been exhausted. By 1950, Brazil was in Phase I. The abrupt decline in
coffee prices in 1953 put even more pressure on the regime, and the country
adopted numerous measures designed to reduce further the flow of imports
and to support the domestic goal of import substitution.
From 1953 to 1963 Brazil was in Phase II, interrupted by two short-lived
Phase III episodes in 1957 and 1961. Multiple exchange rates and quantitative
restrictions were used to allocate foreign exchange, although there was increas-
ing emphasis on the pricing mechanism as the period progressed. The most
salient characteristic of this period was the decline in export earnings. There
was a large and increasing differential incentive toward the production of im-
port substitutes through the first half of the period, and the real effective ex-
change rate (EER) for exports declined drastically until 1957. The Phase III
episodes of 195
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episodes of 1957 and 1961 appear to have prevented further depression of the
real EER for exports. Despite these and other measures, nothing appeared to
stimulate export earnings, and they continued to fall—with sporadic fluctua-
tions—through 1963.
In 1964 Brazil undertook a devaluation and stabilization program that
was much more far-reaching than earlier attempts had been. Several years of
Phase III readjustment followed, and Phase IV cannot be said to have com-
menced until 1968. Since 1968 Brazil has increasingly liberalized her regime,
and the restrictionist content of the vestiges of exchange control has greatly
diminished.
Brazil therefore appears to offer two distinct sequences of stages: a cycl-
ing back and forth between Phase abortive Phase III episodes during
the 1953-1963 period, and then a prolonged Phase III followed by Phase IV in
the late 1960s and early 1970s.
• CHILE
The Great Depression had a severe impact on Chile, and quantitative
restrictions were adopted in the 1930s in response to it. As documented by
Behrman, Chile was in Phase II continuously from the 1930s to 1956. The en-
tire period was characterized by de facto multiple exchange rates, quantitative
restrictions, and continuous alterations of the regime. The nominal exchange
rate was constant for more than twenty years despite a rate of inflation
substantially in excess of the world rate, but exchange rates applying to in-
dividual foreign exchange transaction categories were altered frequently. The
Chilean escudo was increasingly overvalued during this interval, and exports
and imports fell sharply relative to GDP. The restrictiveness of the regime in-
creased almost constantly.
Chile's first postwar attempt at "stabilization" came in 1956 and was
motivated more by the desire to correct internal economic in-
stability—especially rapid inflation—than by events in the external sector. The
Phase III episode begun in 1956 included a massive devaluation and the
elimination of several exchange rate categories. It thus represented a sizable
move toward unified rates and liberalization of the import regime.
Nonetheless the exchange rate was still overvalued. Within two years the entire
program was running into difficulties, as accelerated internal inflation, declin-
ing foreign copper prices, and mounting debt-service obligations put pressure
on the balance of payments, while the overvalued exchange rate still encourag-
ed imports and discouraged exports.
A renewed effort at controlling the rate of inflation was made under a
new government, elected in 1958. This government, believing that capital in-
flows and foreign competition could help in attaining its domestic goals,'4
devalued the escudo again (and, again, by an insufficient amount), in January
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1959, further unified exchange rates, and followed a policy of extensive
liberalization. Imports increased sharply as the combined result of liberaliza-
tion and continued overvaluation, and at the end of 1961 a balance-of-
payments crisis forced a reversion to Phase II quantitative restrictions and
multiple exchange rates. Prior deposit requirements, initially set at 10,000 per-
cent, were a major regulatory instrument, as was a "prohibited" list of im-
ports. The net result was a regime more restrictive than at any time since 1955,
before the first devaluation and liberalization attempt.
An election late in 1964 brought to power yet another government, which
again attempted to liberalize the regime. This was the period during which
Chile had a sliding peg, with devaluations of about 1 percent announced every
15 to 20 days. The regime became increasingly liberal, although the exchange
rate remained overvalued, and export earnings grew—mostly because of high
copper prices. Behrman calls the entire period Phase III. It ended when the
Allende government was elected in 1970, and Phase II quantitative restrictions
were again adopted.
Chile's trade and payments regime has been subject to continual altera-
tion over time. In general Chile represents a rapid-inflation country in which
quantitative restrictions and a Phase II regime have dominated. The frequent
efforts to alter the regime have not been very thoroughgoing or long lasting;
these Phase Ill efforts are extensively analyzed in Part II of this volume.
Chile's experience with the sliding peg is particularly useful in analyzing some
of the factors involved in devaluation-cum-liberalization efforts in rapid-
inflation countries.
COLOMBIA
As in Chile, the Great Depression brought exchange control to Colombia.
Controls were never toally relaxed thereafter, although there were successive
and frequent changes in the payments regime over the postwar years.
The peso became increasingly overvalued during the 1940s as the nominal
exchange rate was held constant. Accumulated foreign exchange reserves
enabled Colombia to maintain a moderately liberal regime until the end of
1950, at which time a large payments deficit emerged. In 1951 Colombia's first
liberalization episode was launched with a devaluation of 27 percent. Sup-
ported by rapidly rising coffee prices, the liberalization continued into 1954,
when the prohibited list of imports was abolished. At the end of that same•
year, however, mounting imports, declining coffee prices, and accumulating
debt-service obligations led to an abrupt reversal, and Phase II quantitative
restrictions were reinstituted. Restrictions intensified continuously until early
1957, but imports continued to mount.
In April of 1957 the adoption of a "stabilization program" initiated
another Phase III episode—a simplification of the multiple exchange rate
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system that had developed and a devaluation. Rapid domestic inflation,
averaging 21 percent annually in 1957 and 1958, eroded part of the increase in
the real exchange rate,'5 and import restrictions continued to be tight over that
period.
Although imports during 1957 and 1958 were one-third below their
1955/56 level, they began increasing in 1959, after "austerity" had brought
the balance-of-payments situation under control. In 1961, when increasing im-
ports once again brought severe balance-of-payments difficulties, import
restrictions increased, and all import licensing was suspended in November
1962. Devaluation was announced later in the same month, with no other ac-
companying actions; import licensing resumed a month later and became in-
creasingly tighter until 1965. In June of that year a devaluation was again
undertaken, and the regime was again liberalized; by mid-1966 virtually all im-
ports had been freed from licensing requirements.
Increasing imports again led to payments pressures, and tight import con-
trols were imposed in the fall of 1966. Rather than repeating earlier devalua-
tion-liberation attempts, however, the Colombian trade and payments
regime was altered in March 1967. A sliding peg, with small, frequent devalua-
tions, was adopted. Liberalization started gradually and haltingly in late 1967,
was increasing fairly systematically by 1969, and has continued since.
Although quantitative restrictions remain an important part of the system,
their relative importance as a means of controlling Colombia's payments situa-
tions has gradually diminished since the late 1960s.
Colombia has experienced many exchange rate changes and five
devaluation-cum-liberalization episodes since 1950. She has had multiple ex-
change rates combined with quantitative restrictions, a devaluation accom-
panied by a sharp cutback in imports, two devaluations followed by short-
lived liberalization, and finally has established the crawling peg. Since
mid-1968 been in Phase IV.
EGYPT
Egypt's trade regime immediately after World War II was conditioned
largely by the fact that her accumulated reserves were held in sterling and were
not fully convertible. Supported by the rising cotton prices accompanying the
Korean War boom in 1950, the trade and payments regime was greatly
liberalized. When cotton prices fell in the latter part of 1951, the liberal Phase
V trade regime also ended.
General import licensing started in late 1951; only "necessities" were im-
portable from the sterling area, but licenses for imports from countries with
which Egypt had bilateral agreements were freely available. The system
became increasingly complex, and Egypt can be characterized as having
entered Phase II by 1952. Import entitlement schemes were introduced in that
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year, and bilateral trading arrangements increased. In 1955, entitlements were
abolished and replaced with a uniform surcharge on imports and a premium
on cotton exports; simultaneously, quantitative restrictions were tightened.
With the Suez War of 1956 the orientation of Egypt's trade shifted toward
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Foreign exchange budgets, allotted on a
quarterly basis, were established in 1957; a generalized export premium system
was introduced, and import surcharges were increased. Another partial de fac-
to devaluation came in 1959, and Egypt remained in Phase II throughout the
period.
In 1961 the government nationalized all large companies, and the import
and export trade became government monopolies. The phase system of
classification outlined above does not fit the Egyptian experience after that
date, though there was a devaluation episode in 1962 which was little more
than window dressing.
GHANA
Ghana had a liberal, Phase V, regime until the end of 1961. Prior to that
date the country had foreign payments regulations in accordance with regula-
tions for sterling area currencies. Reserves, which had accumulated during the
Korean War boom, were gradually run down until 1957, when Ghana became
independent. After that date the rate of depletion increased markedly.
By 1961, reserves had been virtually exhausted, and controls were quickly
imposed. A variety of instruments was employed, and after the initial
shakedown of the system, corruption in import licensing became a massive
problem. As Leith documented, late 1963 marked the beginning of Phase II, as
"changes in regulations were frequent in a frantic attempt to patch up a system
that had one big hole in it: the corrupt and erratic issue of import
licenses. "16
From 1964 to 1966, attempts were constantly made to alter the system,
but imports rose sharply and short-term debt and payments arrears mounted
rapidly. After the overthrow of the Nkrumah government in 1966, the Na-
tional Liberation Council embarked upon a "stabilization program." This
marked the start of Phase III. The program included restrictive monetary and
fiscal policies, tighter import control, and rescheduling of short-term debt.
This was followed in July 1967 by a major devaluation. Ghana is thus the only
country whose devaluation marked the end, rather than the beginning, of
Phase III. Leith marks July 1967 as the date of entry into Phase IV, and im-
port liberalization gradually increased after that time.
By 1971, however, the payments deficit was again unsustainable, and the
government chose to devalue by 80 percent. During this same year a military
government assumed power—apparently with popular support. It partially
rescinde'l the devaluation and abandoned the liberalization. Thus Ghana
returned to Phase I.
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Unlike the Latin American countries, Ghana has had a relatively low rate
of inflation. Changes in the price level at a fixed exchange rate have not been a
major problem, but management of demand and aggregate terms-of-trade
changes have been. Ghana thus provides a case of a country that had two
devaluations, or Phase III, episodes. The first was followed by liberalization,
the second by increasing restrictiveness of the regime; the second, however, is
too recent to permit full analysis.
INDIA
India entered her first Five Year Plan in 1951 with relatively modest
targets and with large reserves of sterling balances accumulated during World
War II. Although considerable attention was devoted to the goals of in-
dustrialization and import substitution, her trade and payments regime re-
mained quite liberal. Such restrictions as existed were not imposed for balance-
of-payments reasons. Heavy import demands, resulting from the start of the
Second Plan and a boom in private investment, led to an abrupt reversal of In-
dia's balance-of-payments situation. Reserves were rapidly exhausted, and
Phase I began in 1956 with the imposition of severely restrictive import licens-
ing. India entered Phase II in 1962 as the trade and payments regime became
increasingly ad hoc, categories of imports multiplied, and export subsidies and
import surcharges developed.
The restrictive content of the payments regime remained high until
1966. Among the ten study countries, India had one of the most restrictive
trade regimes. In 1966 a gross devaluation of 57.6 percent along with
liberalization of imports started India's only Phase III episode. For a variety
of reasons the devaluation and liberalization episQde was followed by a reces-
sion, which lasted into 1968. As recovery started, import demand rose sharply,
and India quickly reentered—and has remained in—Phase II.
India is an instance of a country that has relied predominantly on QRs
continuously since the late 1950s. Her one devaluation episode was half-
hearted at best. It did not bring any lasting relief from Phase H controls, ex-
cept in the sense that restrictions might otherwise have been more severe than
they in fact were.
ISRAEL
Israel is the one country included in the projectwhose economic history
since 1952 shows an almost uninterrupted movement from Phase Ito Phase V.
Starting with rigid import controls in 1948, Israel was in a Phase I regime until
1952, as the new country's resources were absorbed by the inflow of im-
migrants. That phase saw across-the-board rationing, physical allocations of
both domestic goods and imports, and price controls, which obscured the ex-
tent of excess demand within the economy.
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The period from 1952 to 1955 saw a shift from Phase I controls to Phase
domestic interesIII. With almost no intervening Phase II situation, the currency was devalued
tax administratjand the regime rationalized. By 1955 Israel emerged with a much more liberal
change rate systregime and was in Phase IV. Although QRs were still employed, they were
The perioddiminishing in importance relative to price measures. Effective exchange rates
South Korea's rat least kept pace with domestic inflation, and export growth was rapid.
years, althoughMichaely chose to call the 1955-1961 period Phase IV-A.
tempts were miThere was another devaluation in February 1962, with simultaneous
regime, but theremoval of preexisting export subsidies and an announcement that quan-
In August 1titative restrictions would be replaced by price incentives. Michaely denotes
reforms was anithis as the start of Phase IV-B because liberalization continued, although
centives were rsomewhat more slowly than planned.'7 By 1969, Michaely places Israel in
Frank, Kim, anPhase V; exchange rate alterations and other price measures were used to not covered inregulate the balance-of-payments situation, and current account transactions
The Southwere largely free of quantitative controls.
Korea's exportIsrael represents a country whose experience with quantitative restrictions
real GNP. A naconsists almost entirely of an effort to dismantle them. The entire period after policies in that
1952 was characterized by diminishing reliance upon QRs. The movement
where the ratefrom severe QRs to a relatively free current account was accompanied by rapid
the exchangeexport growth. After the late 1950s, export incentives were used, between native trade aidevaluations, to maintain the real exchange rate for export earnings, reforms of 19(
domestic and n
Soum KOREA
After World War II Korea was partitioned, and her normal trade flows THE PrnLu
were disrupted. South Korea was thus confronted with the problems of
Thereconstruction both from the war and from partition. Quantitative controls rapid growth. F
were immediately employed, and South Korea was in Phase I from that time of-payments pr
until the end of the Korean War in 1953. The government was heavily involved
As docum'in foreign transactions during that period, and a bewildering variety of ex- mounting oppo
change rates was in force.
adopted to offs
From 1953 until the end of 1960, South Korea was in Phase II. That was a II continued ur
period of increasingly sophisticated control mechanisms. Complicated pro- troduced, and
cedures were used to assist barter trade and to facilitate imports in the face of a monetary and I
large current account deficit sustained by aid inflows,
ended early in 1
The periods 1961/62 and 1964/65 represent two distinct Phase trols were rem
episodes. There was a massive devaluation in 1961, accompanied by an at- been lifted, an
tempt to unify exchange rates and liberalize the trade and payments regime. A at a fixed exch
revolution in 1961 ended with assumption of power by the military. This Although
government's expansionary fiscal policies, combined with a poor crop, reemerged by
resulted in excess demand, and in 1963 rapid inflation forced a return to Phase relatively mode
II, with multiple exchange rates and stringent controls on trade. controls nonetl
The second Phase III, in 1964/65, was much more successful. There was lions, another e
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domestic interest rates were raised substantially in a major monetary reform;
tax administration was also reformed. During this period also, the multiple ex-
change rate system was unified, and trade restrictions were eased.
The period from 1966 until August 1972 can be characterized as Phase IV.
South Korea's regime has continued to be fairly liberal compared with earlier
years, although some quantitative restrictions are still in effect. Several at-
tempts were made to complete the liberalization of the trade and payments
regime, but these efforts never came to fruition.
In August 1972, in an effort to achieve greater price stability, a new set of
reforms was announced. The exchange rate was again devalued, and export in-
centives were reduced. These reforms occurred after the research for the
Frank, Kim, and Westphal study of South Korea was completed, and they are
not covered in this volume.
The South Korean experience is interesting in a number of regards. South
Korea's export growth has been phenomenal, as has been the growth rate of
real GNP. A natural and important question is the role of trade and payments
policies in that growth performance. South Korea also represents a country
where the rate of domestic inflation has been relatively high. Management of
the exchange rate under those conditions is also relevant in analyzing alter-
native trade and payments regimes. Finally, the South Korean monetary
reforms of 1964/65 provide a basis for analyzing the relationship of the
domestic and monetary sector and foreign trade policies.
THE PHILIPPINES
The postwar reconstruction period in the Philippines was one of relatively
rapid growth. Exchange control was introduced in 1949 in response to balance-
of-payments pressures. The Philippines remained in Phase I until about 1955.
As documented by Baldwin, Phase II began in the mid-1950s amidst
mounting opposition to quantitative restrictions. Partial ad hoc measures were
adopted to offset some of these undesired results of the QR system, and Phase
II continued until April 1960. At that time multiple exchange rates were in-
troduced, and a Phase III effort at formal liberalization began. Restrictive
monetary and fiscal policy was part of the liberalization package. Phase III
ended early in 1962, when a floating exchange rate was adopted and most con-
trols were removed. By the end of 1965, all forms of exchange control had
been lifted, and the Philippines was in Phase V with a fully liberalized regime
at a fixed exchange rate.
Although growth rates were satisfactory, balance-of-payments pressures
reemerged by 1967, and controls were reintroduced. Although they were
relatively moderate contrasted with those of the late 1950s and early l960s, the
controls nonetheless represented a shift to Phase I. In spite of these restric-
tions, another exchange crisis developed late in 1969 in response to a highly ex-
pansionary government budget. The following February, the government
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decided to float the exchange rate and to remove controls, thus reentering
Phase Ill.
The following years were ones of continued liberalization, and the
economy was in Phase IV by 1971—the terminal year of the Philippine
study—and has continued in that regime. Thus the Philippines has had two
periods of quantitative restrictions—the second shorter-lived and less restric-
tive than the first. Each period has ended with the adoption of floating ex-
change rates (although inflation has been moderate) and with fairly rapid
decontrol and liberalization.
TURKEY
Turkey started the 1950s with a fully liberal, Phase V regime and a very
rapid rate of economic growth. Balance-of-payments pressures mounted in
1951 and 1952, as domestic inflationary pressures were dampened by a massive
and unsustainable flow of imports. By late 1952, payments arrears were
massive, and quantitative restrictions were imposed. Two years of reliance
upon QRs were followed by multiple exchange rates, export incentives, and
other efforts to patch up the system. The restrictiveness of the regime
increased sharply as domestic inflation rates reached 20-25 percent per year
and exceeded substantially the rate of de facto partial devaluation.
In 1958 Turkey embarked upon a "stabilization program." Gross
devaluation increased the official exchange rate more than 200 percent, im-
ports were liberalized, and restrictive monetary and fiscal policies were in-
stituted. Increased export earnings prompted further liberalization after :1960,
and Turkey experienced a brief Phase IV episode, with gradually diminishing
restrictiveness in her payments regime.
By 1964, however, balance-of-payments pressures were increasing sharp-
ly, and reliance on QRs began increasing. The exchange rates became increas-
ingly overvalued, and QRs were employed—along with export incentives, im-
port surcharges, and other price measures—for the remainder of the 1960s.
The entire period from 1964 to mid-1970 can therefore be characterized as
Phase II.
In 1970 Turkey embarked upon another Phase III devaluation/liberaliza-
tion program. This was rapidly followed by continued liberalization—Phase
IV—which has continued to the time of writing.
In all, Turkey had two Phase II periods ofQRs and two devaluation-cum-
liberalization episodes. The 1958 Phase III is of particular interest because in-
flation, which had been at 20 to 25 percent per annum, was brought under con-
trol relatively quickly.
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Trends over Time
Figure 2-1 is a graphic representation of the chronological sequences of phases
for each country included in our study. The most obvious feature is that all
countries have experienced a variety of changes in their trade and payments
regimes. The average time in a phase over all countries (excluding Egypt since
1961) from the time exchange controls were initially adopted was just under
three years. Colombia had the shortest average duration of phases—less than
two years; India had the longest—just over four years.
Given the frequency of phase changes, it is somewhat hazardous to at-
tempt to infer trends. For example, the Philippines, until 1966, appears to
"progress" through the sequence of phases toward full liberalization; the
following year, however, quantitative restrictions were reintroduced, although
the regime was not highly restrictive and the phase did not last long.
The combined experience of the ten countries seems to fall roughly into
three categories:
1. One group, starting initially from Phase I, appears to have moved over time
toward greater reliance on pricing measures. This group includes Brazil,
Colombia, Israel, South Korea, and the Philippines.
2. Another group has repeatedly attempted liberalizations, none of which has
endured; their behavior is best described as "cycling" back and forth bet-
ween Phases II, III, and 1V. This group includes Chile and Ghana.
3. A third group of countries has generally been in Phase H, with only infre-
quent, short-lived devaluation-cum-liberalization episodes. India, Turkey,
and Egypt (insofar as nationalization of all foreign trade can be considered
as Phase II) appear to be in this group.
1. By 1956, all countries except Ghana had abandoned a fully liberalized trade
regime, and Ghana was one of only two countries that were in Phase I at
any time after 1957." Thus, Phase I typically appears to be a short period
that immediately follows the abandonment of a liberalized trade regime.
After an initial experience with across-the-board quantitative restrictions,
countries employing QRs have rejected them in favor of a more
sophisticated regime with some reliance on price measures.
2. By the mid-1950s, most of the ten countries were in Phase II. The excep-
r
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Table 2-6 shows the number of countries in each phase in each year since
1950. Despite the hazards of "counting countries" and the difficulty in judg-
ing the exact date of a change from one phase to another, the tabulation sug-
gests certain weak trends that are obscured in observing oscillations in the ten
countries individually:
i
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1950
1951 4
1952 4
1953
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Table 2-6. Number of Countries in Each Phase, 1950-1972 (quarterly count
converted to annual basis)a
39
Year
Phase
I II III IV V
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
4.00
4.00
4.00
2.50
2.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
3.50
4.25
0.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00 .
2.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
1.75
3.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
0.75
0.50
1.00
1.00
1.00
6.25
6.50
4.75
4.75
4.00
0.00
0.50
2.25
2.00
1.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
1.25
2.50
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1960
1961
1962
1964
1.00
1.00
1.50
1.00
0.00
3,25
1.00
3.50
4.75
6.00
1.25
3.00
1.75
0.25
1.00
3.50
4.00
2.75
3.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
0.00
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.00
3.75
2.00
1.25
1.50
2.00
3.00
3.25
4.25
2.00
1.00
2.00
2.75
2.50
4.50
4.00
. 0.25
1.00
0.50
0.00
1.00
1970
1971
1972
0.25
0.00
0.75
1.75
2.00
2.00
2.00
0.00
0.25
4.00
'6.00
5.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Source: Text and individual country studies.
.
aEach country's phases were dated by quarters, and the number of quarters countries were in a
particular phase was summed and divided by four to get the data. For 1970, for example, one
country was in Phase I for one quarter.
bEgypt is excluded from the tabulations after 1962, since foreign trade was nationalized and
her experience does not fit the characteristics of any phase after that time.
tions were Ghana, India, and Israel. Ghana had not yet begun using QRs,
and India entered a prolonged Phase I in 1956; both countries followed the
same pattern as the majority of the countries, but with a lag. Israel was real-
ly the only exception to the trend, in that her reliance on QRs was already
being reduced.
3. By the last half of the 1960s, Phase IV prevailed in most of the ten coun-
tries, although Israel's liberalization had progressed sufficiently to be
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regarded as Phase V. Brazil, Colombia, and South Korea were all in Phase
IV; their exports were generally growing rapidly, and their dependence on
QRs was diminishing. The Philippines had been in Phases IV and V until
1967 and—after a three-year Phase lepisode—reentered Phase IV in 1970.
It
is of some interest that, with the exception of Israel and—for a short
time—the Philippines, no country totally abandoned controls even on current
account transactions.'9 Even South Korea, with perhaps the longest Phase IV
experience and with very rapidly growing. foreign exchange earnings, did not
abandon the vestiges of her QR system. Whether earlier experience with Phase
II regimes resulted in a desire to maintain a more viable QR system as
represented by Phase IV, or whether another five to ten years will find many
countries entering Phase V, is an open question that will be considered subse-
quently. It is, of course, also possible that countries in Phase IV will go back to
a QR regime at some future date.
It is hazardous to infer too much from simple counting of countries. Yet
there is some trend toward greater reliance on price measures. Greater
sophistication is found in the administration of quantitative restrictions and in
the use of price incentives to help achieve national objectives.
The country studies include twenty-two devaluations, observed in suffi-
cient depth to permit their analysis on a comparable basis here. It is important
to investigate the sorts of policies that have accompanied devaluation, the ex-
periences of countries after Phase III episodes, and the impact that transition
to viable liberalized regimes has on growth.
NOTES
I. U.N. estimates were used in deriving the dollar value of gross domestic products.. For a
description of the methods employed, which essentially entail using the "best" exchange rate, see
United Nations, Yearbook of NationalAccounts Statistics 1971, vol. III (New York, 1973), p. 16.
2. If any country attaining a per capita income level of $1,000 (or any other cutoff figure)
were immediately regarded as noncomparable to countries with income levels below that figure,
and the lessons arising out of that country's experience were rejected as irrelevant for other
developing countries, only the "failures" would be left to draw upon for comparison. This is a
fundamental problem whenever samples of developing countries are used for analysis, but
arguments can be made in defense of the procedure vis-a-vis the countries that experienced rapid
growth in the nineteenth century. When it comes to a country such as Israel, which was clearly in
the "developing" category in the 1950s, it is inappropriate to reject that experience simply because
of rapid growth; it is, of course, pertinent to examine whatever special factors may have con-
tributed to that experience, although there are some "special circumstances" confronting every
country.
3. Use of constant-price series for the two years would not alter the data significantly.
However, a strong caveat is in order when interpreting these data. They are not strictly comparable
across countries because of the many reasons indicated in the notes to the table, because of dif.
ferences in concepts and classifications among countries, and because relative prices differ among
r41
countries. In addition, the size of the statistical discrepancy, which was prorated among sectors in
accordance with their reported size, is sufficiently great to cast doubt on the accuracy of the
figures.
4. The individual country studies provide a wealth of information about economic policy
and the environment in which it was formulated.
5. Price change data are presented in greater detail in Chapter 8 and in the individual coun-
try studies.
6. On a 1958 base the IMF index of the dollar prices of exports of industrial countries is 99
for 1953; 100 for 1958 and 1962; 105 in 1965; 106 in 1968; and 114 in 1970. This implies a rate of
inflation of industrial countries' export prices of just over 1 percent a year between 1960 and 1970,
with a marked acceleration toward the end of the decade.
7. Guarantee, or "prior," deposits are funds that must be placed, usually without earning
interest, in the central bank or other government depository at the time of application for an im-
port license. Often these funds are not returned until after the goods have been financed and have
cleared customs.
8. Note that the emphasis is on techniques employed for balance-of-payments reasons, not
for encouraging import substitution or export promotion. The relationship between the two objec-
tives is a central question in this volume.
9. One of the hypotheses set forth in the analytical framework was that there might appear
to be a logic to the evolution of countries through the phases. This author is not prepared to reject
the hypothesis entirely, but no meaningful generalizations on this point have emerged from the
country studies.
10. This leads to the necessity for distinguishing the effective exchange rate (EER) from
nominal exchange rates. Careful definitions of these concepts are presented in Chapter 5.
11. It should be noted that liberalization, as used throughout this volume, refers to the
removal of quantitative restrictions and a shift toward reliance upon price interventions. It does
not necessarily imply a reduction in the protection accorded to import substitutes or to export in-
dustries.
12. Again, it should be noted that some QRs might be retained for purposes other than
maintenance of an acceptable balance-of-payments position. The important point is that quan-
titative restrictions would not be imposed or altered in response to present or anticipated changes
in foreign exchange earnings. In practice, of course, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether
protectionist sentiment arises for balance-of-payments reasons, or whether those reasons are simp-
ly used as a rationale for protection.
13. It was necessary to date the phases precisely in each country in order to analyze each one's
experience statistically on a comparable basis. In some instances that was clear cut. In others,
country authors gave very rough indications of dates, and precise initial and terminal points were
selected based on a careful reading of the country study. In still other instances an author's ex-
planation of events was clearly inconsistent with the phase assigned. In the discussion that follows,
the major departures from authors' dating are noted.
14. Behrman calls the entire period from July 1956 to December 1958 a single Phase Ill
episode. There were, however, two distinct devaluation episodes, one in July 1956 and one in
January 1959. To analyze these, the dating for Chile in this volume is: Phase III, from July 1956 to
July 1958; Phase 11, from August 1958 to December 1958; Phase III, from January to March 1959;
and Phase IV, from April 1959 to December 1961.
15. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of PLD-EERs, or the real exchange rate.
16. Leith, p. 7.
17. Michaely does not label the 1962 devaluation as a Phase III episode but, for purposes of
analysis, it is so labeled here. Exchange controls were still in effect prior to devaluation, and the in-
tent was to reduce their importance.
18. Ghana was in Phase I in 1961 and 1972. The other country was the Philippines, which had
abandoned quantitative restrictions by the mid- 1960s, reentered Phase 1 in response to a payments
crisis in the late l960s, but liberalized again with a devaluation in 1970.
19. Of course, that statement is also true for most developed countries, and it is really a ques-
tion of whether controls are altered in response to balance-of-payments pressures. By that
criterion South Korea and Brazil should also be regarded as having abandoned controls.
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